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The Child as a Person
Paulo Barrozo
Boston College Law School
A response to ‘International Adoption: The Human Rights Position’
Elizabeth Bartholet*
The child is objectified and commodified when interna-
tional adoption is seen through the lenses of border polic-
ing, protectionism, national pride and cultural fetishism.
Unfortunately, this is the approach to international adop-
tion embraced and promoted by the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption, the adoption laws of most of its
state parties, the policies of UNICEF and the attitudes of
many childcare and advocacy groups around the world. To
disapprove of their views is not to question their good
intentions or seriousness of purpose. The problem, in fact,
is deeper, and ultimately rests on muddled conceptions of
human rights and the personhood of children.
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point and set
the record straight. Conspicuously in Article 1, the Hague
Convention announces what will be the emphasis through-
out the treaty, ‘to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or
traffic in children’. UNICEF’s policy statements on inter-
national adoption tend to reinforce this approach to inter-
national adoption, denouncing ‘the growth of an industry
around adoption, where profit, rather than the best inter-
ests of children, takes centre stage’.1
Unicef’s Children on the Brink 2004: A Joint Report of
New Orphan Estimates and a Framework for Action docu-
ments the shocking number of 16,200,000 double orphans
in Africa, Asia and Latin America alone. Despite that, the
46-page report mentions adoption ⁄ adoptive just twice, and
then only in the context of makeshift or half-hearted local-
only adoption options: ‘There is a pressing need to ensure
that family based care is available for these children, either
through support for relatives, foster care, local adoptive
placement, or community organizations that are integrally
linked to the community’ (p. 15); ‘For children who slip
through the extended family safety net, arrangements pref-
erable to traditional institutional care include foster place-
ments, local adoption, surrogate family groups integrated
into communities, and smaller-scale group residential care
in homelike settings’ (p. 20). In the same report, institu-
tionalization is referred to euphemistically as ‘Center for
Orphaned Children’, ‘Community School’, ‘Day Care Cen-
ter’, ‘Center for Children’ and the like.
The historical lineage of the position taken by the Hague
Convention and UNICEF is no mystery. From as early as
the 15th century, struggles to form and consolidate nation
states turned into efforts to create large and replenishable
armies and working forces. From the perspective of emerg-
ing nation states, the first and most precious natural
resource was their population, and the highest policy prior-
ity population management. ‘The principal object of my
policy’, stated Joseph II in the 18th century, was ‘the pres-
ervation and increase of the number of subjects. It is’, he
added, ‘from the greatest number of subjects that all the
advantages of the state derive’. This view became part of
the policy DNA of nation states and, after the Second
World War, of their international organization creatures.
By the second part of the 20th century, population man-
agement ideologies were compounded by the inability or
unwillingness to transcend the resilience of localism and
culturalism against clear commitment to the universalism
of the human rights of the child as a person. No one
should think it is easy to honor mandates as important as
the individual rights of the child when deeply torn between
contradicting values and rationales.
On the other hand, in many ways it has never been bet-
ter to be a child than in our time. The evolution of the
legal and moral status of the child has, however, been a
slow one. It took millennia for children to progress from
being little more than labor and transactional resource for
families and reserve and replacement economic and military
resource for states. Later, children came to be seen by post-
colonial sensibilities as culture carriers. In most parts of the
world, only relatively recently have children achieved the
legal status of object of protection on the part of families,
societies and states. Twenty years ago the arc of this evolu-
tion reached the point of considering the child as an inde-
pendent, self-standing subject of human rights. But the
earlier stages of the evolution of the legal and moral status
of the child have never been completely replaced. The
result is the truncated and ambivalent conception of the
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child as a person and subject of human rights that is
embodied in the policies of the Hague Convention and
UNICEF.
Against this historical background and our present cir-
cumstances, Bartholet’s article is a critical and constructive
call for action in favor of a true commitment to the child
as a subject of human rights.
Good jurists are like this. Give them a problem, and
they will think their way through a principle under which
to address it. Accept their principle, and they will hold you
to it, boiling the principle down to its detailed institutional
entailments. Bartholet is a good jurist. The problem here is
clear: sound social, developmental and biomedical research
prove with rare consensus and an abundance of cohering
evidence that no solution to the problem of unparenthood
compares favorably to growing up as daughters or sons in
adoptive families. The principle Bartholet offers is to con-
sider each and every child as an independent and fully
fledged subject of human rights – as a person. The institu-
tional entailment of this principle, she continues, is
straightforward: states and international organizations are
under an international human rights obligation proactively
to promote and facilitate urgent adoption. In light of the
devastating effects of institutionalization and other forms
of crushing dependence and uncertainty, states should con-
currently plan both for domestic and for transborder adop-
tion options, proceeding with whichever offers a nurturing
family for the unparented child first.
I agree. The ubiquity of the problem of unparenthood
and the universality of the human rights principle to grow
as a daughter or son in a family requires nothing less than
a truly cosmopolitan response. Unparented children and
prospective parents around the world should meet, regard-
less of country, race or culture. International adoption is an
essential component of this response.
Now, let me make it clear, true adoption (or permanent
guardianship cum de facto adoption where the domestic
law does not allow close relatives formally to adopt) by
extended family is better than other types of adoption, pro-
vided that the general conditions for adoption are met and
it builds on existing trust, loyalty, care and love. But the
existential limbo of uncertain status in which children often
find themselves in extended family or community place-
ment is no substitute for real parent–child relationships.
All too often, placement of children with extended family
or community means little more than unpaid and unregu-
lated domestic labor under parental-like authority. This is
no substitute for the experience of unconditional love
growing up with loving and caring parents.
A staggering number of children are either institutional-
ized, condemned to lives on the streets or to live as acces-
sories to families or communities that will never fully and
unconditionally welcome them as sons and daughters.
Their fate should not depend on a news-making calamity
like the recent Haitian earthquake which led that country
to cooperate with other countries to expedite adoption of
unparented children. And it will not if we heed the diag-
nosis and proposals Bartholet advances in her article.
In terms of law, morality and policy, it makes a world of
difference to approach the humanitarian crisis of global un-
parenthood from a discerning human rights perspective
rather than from the perspective of populational manage-
ment and cultural reproduction. Bartholet persuasively
argues that we take the first perspective. It is illegal, a
moral disgrace and a policy disaster to do otherwise.
The international human rights of the child reject the
suffering, regimentation and isolation of children without
parents. Because the effects of institutionalization, aban-
donment and second-class belonging generally prevent chil-
dren from fully enjoying other rights later in life, the
human right to grow in a family is a precondition for the
enjoyment of most other human rights.
Unparented children are the most discrete and insular
minority of any country, often subjected to the brutal logics
of the orphanage-to-asylum pipelines. Until they find a
nurturing family, their predicament is one of crushing vul-
nerability and dependence upon their respective states and
the institutions that claim to speak for them while holding
fast to objectifying and commodifying preconceptions and
prejudices. The stakes in Bartholet’s argument could not be
higher. And she is right.
Note
1. http://www.unicef.org/media/media_41918.html [accessed 23 Janu-
ary 2010].
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